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Ricardou: Interview: "How to Reduce Fallacious Representative Innocence, Wo

An Interview with Jean Ricardou:
"How to Reduce Fallacious Representative Innocence,
Word by Word"
Answers to a Questionnaire by Michel Sirvent

1. Doesn't Le Thdatre des metamorphoses explore the practical
consequences formulated by Barthes when he concluded that "the
theory of the text can only coincide with a practice of writing"
assuming that a "theory of the text cannot be satisfied by a
metalinguistic exposition " ('From Work to Text" 164)?
Allow me a preliminary remark. The trouble you take to
approach certain aspects of my work by calling forth an opinion that is
supposed notorious by Roland Barthes presents an advantage and a
disadvantage. The advantage? This is, of course, in establishing what
is known in order to go towards what is supposed to be less known.
The disadvantage? Through this premise, one is led to presume a type
of origin. I must therefore avert any possible misunderstanding
without delay: none of my books, and in particular, Le Theatre des
metamorphoses, is of a Barthesian obedience.
Undoubtedly, from a distance, various indications can point to a
sort of concordance, relatively speaking, of course, between the
appealing essayist and the minimal writer I happen to be: they are
deceptive. Here are two of them.
The first, how might I put it, belongs to a literary milieu: we are
familiar with Barthes' closeness to Tel Quel, a review on whose
editorial committee I sat until my departure in 1971. Yet it is worth
simply understanding that my thought, then in the process of being
formed, at that time was not consolidated enough to allow me to enunciate several disagreements which were then growing.
The second sign is, if you will, of a lexical order: the sentence you
recall includes the occurrences "text," "ecriture," that are found no
less frequently beneath my pen. But it is preferable to grasp that they
are far from bearing the same concepts in both cases. I have the
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fault of thinking that these notions in Barthes-which are often
claimed in an openly metaphoric status-are too fleeting to serve as
precise instruments of examination, and that they tend to possess, on
the contrary, a certain operational vigor in my work, especially my
most recent, because they are articulated in an analytical ensemble
where their metaphorical tenor dwindles. Thus in the article that you
quote, Barthes affirms that "the text must not be understood as a computable object," whereas for Textics-this discipline that today I am
elaborating with an informal group of a few other researchers-the
text understood technically, which is something a little bit different,
pertains to what is calculable in its structures and their effects, even if
it is difficult to control it completely from this angle.
The experimentation of Le Theatre des metamorphoses comes,
to tell the truth, from further away: from an effort, apparent in my first
volumes, to problematize fiction by confronting it in various ways
with an emphasis on the ecrit that permits it. To be brief, let us say that
this approach is indicated in the title itself of my second novel, 1965,
which divides itself, on the one hand, La Prise de Constantinople and
on the other La Prose de Constantinople, as well as the third, 1969
(Les lieux-dits) which is accompanied by a subtitle "little guide to
traveling through the book."
Yet the attempt to include, through roundabout ways, that which,
in order to complete itself with apparent candor, fiction represses, led
me also to observe that which, in order to complete itself with similar
conspicuous innocence, reflection on fiction represses. For, among
the different procedures in fiction capable of bringing to light the &Tit
that permits it, one must consider the passages that could reflect themselves to the point of taking up the &Tit as a theme in a certain way.
However, except for introducing them in my novels in the form of pure
reflexive sequences that would have bluntly analyzed such active
mechanisms on the page, it was necessary to blend these passages as
much as possible in the ensemble, in short to inflict upon them the very
rules that invested fiction obeyed. It is this effort to subject similar
reflections on the ecrit to these particular rules which made me
realize, word by word, in an eminently practical manner, at what point
my articles, elsewhere, on various ecrits, constantly eluded all contamination by their object in order to establish themselves. Questioning a first sanctuary (the sanctuary of the fictional &Tit preserved
from reflection on itself) surreptitiously led me to challenge a second
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one (the sanctuary of the ecrit reflecting on fiction while protecting
itself from its mechanisms).
Even if this criss-crossing of fiction and its reflection never completed itself for me without the receding of a certain overall picture,
even if I think I may say today that they form the jolts tied to what I
could call a new understanding of the "text," still I would not know
how to overlook the role of practical experimentation in this type of
boomerang effect.
Consequently Le Theatre des metamorphoses is less an exploration of the practical consequences of Barthes' judgement than an
experiment risked within the internal process of a somewhat reflected
work.
2. With the 1982 publication ofLe Th6atre des metamorphoses
we could say that its "mixed" mode ofexposition was the result ofthe
coincidence of a double interactive practice, one implied in the
writing offictional works, the other in the theory of the artistic text.

Said differently, isn't this mixity (of discursive regimes, registers of
language, intertexts, representative supports) also the outcome, at
the time, ofyour double activity as novelist and theoretician of the
Nouveau Roman?
What I have just called "a certain overall picture," is, among
other things, the "materialist" concern (if one wishes to understand
this word not in a common sense but in its philosophical usage) with
shielding my work, at least from the too much established specializations of today, and, notably the one which separates a practice from its
theory. Similarly for "literature," a term I use in order to go more
quickly. Doubtless some literary hacks have enjoyed reflecting with
care on literary mechanisms through writing. Doubtless some
professors have risked creating works by themselves. Yet they constitute, these and others, but a tiny minority. Generally we are not surprised that literature is made by persons who seemingly do not find it
too useful to reflect about it profoundly in the open, nor that reflection
on literature be carried out by people who apparently do not consider
it a point of honor to produce it. My work, I admit, goes firmly against
this division, more accepted than thought out, and this may be seen,
notably, in the alternation of my novels with my theoretical works.
Thus my double effort as novelist and theoretician of the Nouveau
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Roman seems to me to have been the crucible of this encounter of fiction and its reflection, finally, on the very same pages. Insofar as they
were already accomplished by the same operator, they found themselves, how could I say, psychologically and technically less foreign to
each other.
3. Once having established a structured tie, then having completed the complementary stimulus between the writing offiction and
its theoretical reflection in order to make them blendyet contest each
other in the same work, why didn't you pursue this avenue (that of
intratextual transtheory and transfiction)? Does the conceptual
opposition between "theory" and "fiction" seem less pertinent to
you today? Is it replaced by the opposition between "script" and
"text"? How did you arrive at these distinctions, currently found at
the beginning of the Elements de textique, between "script" and
"text," "scripture" and "texture," "representation" and "metarepresentation"?

Revelations minuscules, en guise de preface, a la gloire de Jean
Paulhan, those one hundred pages or so added to the beginning of
Revolutions minuscules in 1988 for a new edition is not so far in many
respects from certain experiences of which you speak. But although I
have not renounced this project, it is true that I have limited my work
in this direction. I perceive two reasons for this.
One is external, if you wish. The singular animosity or the
curious silence that critics showed regarding Le Thedtre des
metamorphoses confirmed my hypotheses, that, for the moment, an
effort to mould these regions is liable to anathema. Assuming the
situation might one day be less so in this regard, I consider it is
presently a little too obtuse.
The other is internal. The relationship between my fiction and
my theoretical works obeys a sort of alternation. First an experimental volume, then a phase of reflection that attempts to grasp its
implications and consequences, even if, for reasons I will not stop to
consider here, other books besides my own shall eventually be
solicited. La Prise de Constantinople, in 1965, then Le Thedtre des
metamorphoses, in 1982, formed the two main experiences which
each opened up a long theoretical period for me. It is in the phase thus
allowed by Le Thedtre des metamorphoses that I came to anticipate
the possibility of this perhaps new discipline: Textics.
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In particular Textics observes that fiction and theory, even
though they might poorly accept their reciprocal contamination, are
nevertheless, in a certain light, ecrits of the same nature. According to
its constitutive postulate, in effect, ecrits can only accommodate two
sorts of fruitful structures. On one hand, those which contribute to an
effect of representation, that is, to quote an accepted definition, call
"forth to the mind through the means of language" [langage] (we call
scriptures those structures capable of an effect of representation, and
script ecrit that actually bears them). On another level, those which
exceed this effect of representation and participate in an effect of
meta-representation, that is, let transpire that which representation
tends to obliterate within its mechanism (we then name textures those
structures that bring about meta-representation and text the ecrit
when it respects this order). Insofar as ecrits of fiction and theory
essentially obey the pure representative regime, they are-beyond
their differences-both scripts. However close they might be, fiction
and theory do not present identical resistance, of course, to a possible
meta-representative process. Inasmuch as fiction accepts a clear
"imaginary" dimension, briefly let us say, allows a certain lack of
being for what it represents, it poses less of an obstacle to an activity
that exceeds representativeness itself Insofar as theory, except for
declaring itself fictive, claims the greatest accuracy possible concerning reality, if you wish, it could only offer active resistance to the
operations that exceed its effort at representation.
If prolonging my brief deliberations in too simple a mode may be
tolerated, I will retrospectively observe that in the background of La
Prise de Constantinople, what always interested me in the Nouveau
Roman volumes, perhaps somewhat gropingly, were metarepresentative procedures. Consequently, to take up the passage from
this novel to Le The
des metamorphoses succinctly but more
technically, we can say that in the first, it is fiction, less restive, that
undergoes meta-representation with its extreme rules and the intensification of a certain self-reflexivity, and that in the second, it is
particularly theory, although more resistant, that receives in turn
those two sorts of treatment. In short, the contamination of theory by
fiction in this book is not a simple fictionalization of theory, which
would become purely "imaginary," but rather a relativization, as
calculated as possible, of that which theory asserts through the impact
of meta-representative structures developed, so far, more easily
within fiction.
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4. With this new concept of "meta-representation" the concern
is clearly no longer to challenge but to surpass representation. Is this

a radical change of strategy?
Rather than a change of strategy, I prefer to speak of a broader
perspective. To persist, as I have too much, in "challenging representation" could allow one to believe that it was useful to undermine
representation because it was intrinsically ill-fated. What Textics
assumes from now on, to get to the point, are the following three positions: on the one hand, representation is a primordial activity and
there is no interest in directly attacking it in itself; on the other, representation constituently makes one see only at the price of an eventual
censure of that which allows it to take place. Finally, the patient
bringing to light of what is thereby obfuscated should make it possible
technically and intelligibly to reduce fallacious innocence, its way of
showing and, as a result, what it shows, by making perceptible word
by word and conceptually the hidden reasons that institute it.
5. I presume that it is because Le Thdatre des metamorphoses
pushes mew-representative work very far that it is, as you have told
me elsewhere, "untranslatable." Would you care to clarify your
remarks concerning this question?

Yes, it is certainly the incessant meta-representative concern that
renders this work "untranslatable." In effect, among the various
procedures capable of calling forth, in a fiction for example, the ecrit
that permits it, one must not only consider, as I said earlier, passages
that would in some way take up the ecrit as a theme (which form those
particular textures that Textics calls catoptrotextures) but also the
bringing into play of added regulations (these in fact constitute all
other textures) through which the ecrit directly displays itself, one
could say. However, in order to answer you with care, I would hope to
proceed first with a schematic reminder of more or less accepted
functionings.
If one calls translation, quite simply, the manoeuver that substitutes a given formulation, a certain identical other, or for lack of better
term, a similar one on the level of meaning, then it is clear that this
operation is indispensable (within an idiom), useful (between several
languages) and . . . dangerous (in both cases).
Translation is indispensable within a language because it perhttps://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol15/iss2/7
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forms a constitutive function: without it, meaning could never come
about. From this angle, meaning is virtual in a well-formed oral or
written statement. It only becomes actual upon being heard or read.
This permanent deciphering, even if its mechanism for the person who
performs it is largely unconscious, merely stems from an intralinguistic translation. On the level of meaning, one only understands
what one is able to formulate in a different way.
Translation is only useful when it occurs from one language to
another, because it plays a propagating role. Meaning is constituted
with an oral or written statement well-formed and well deciphered in a
certain language. It is divulged, simply, by its transfer into a different
language. To be less expeditious, we can say that the passage of
meaning from one language to another supposes a minimum of three
related translations: the possibility of intralinguistic translation in the
original language, without which the formula to be translated would
not have attained meaning (phase of constitution); the accomplishment of an interlinguistic translation that ensures the transfer of one
idiom to another (phase of propagation); the possibility of an intralinguistic translation in the target language, without which the
meaning of the translated formulation would not be achieved (phase of

reconstitution).
Since it is indispensable to the constitution of meaning (in a language) and useful to its propagation (among several), translation
should not be refuted. But one would have to be naively dazzled by its
considerable advantages to overlook its true drawbacks. In effect, if
the constitution of meaning presumes at least two ingredients (the
formula that virtualizes and the deciphering that actualizes it), then, in
principle, translation, whether it be within one language or in between
two, and since it always supposes, reversibly, the replacement of the
emitted formula, inflicts on meaning, by making it seem autonomous,
the effacement of the material bases of its coming about.
Yet this magic, in short, representative innocence, causes two
very serious related faults with regard to meaning: one, impoverishment, is understood easily enough; the other, the restoration of
innocence ("l'innocentement"), is generally less accepted.
There is always impoverishment of meaning because with the
withdrawal of the initial formula, translation in its effect dissolves the
added semanticism that material specificity had inferred. The
assumption that the meaning of a formula usually goes beyond, often
more than a little, that which is brought about by the simple exchange
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with a different homosemic formula is indeed emphasized, however
simply, by the classic division of the denoted and connoted (this, we
insist if necessary, exceeds the particular instance successively blown
out of proportion by Hjelmslev and Barthes).
Thus, to write with Baudelaire:

Mon enfant, ma soeur,
Songe a la douceur
D'aller ld-bas vivre ensemble.

. . .

amounts to overstepping the meaning we obtain, either within a language and possibly from one language to another, by a homosemic
exchange of words. We remark that the rhyme which according to
Textics belongs to the category of isochorotextures (metarepresentative structures by the allocation of elements specially tied
to identical places), produces, in this case, its own supplementary
effect on the register of meaning. Let us observe this more closely with
other technical notions of autochorotextures (meta-representative
structures by allocation of lexical elements in superposition) and of
metacratylism (calculated semantic fruit which ensues from this constructed superposition). Here the lexical superposition obviously
derives from the analytical virtue of the rhyme or, if one prefers a more
technical enunciation, the isochorotexture in that it focuses on a
semantized element, provokes an autochorotexture. On one level,
because of isophonism (identical sound in both words), and because
of isochorism (identical place of respective words in the two verses),
the rhyme finds itself promoting, notably, the second syllable of the
word "douceur," or, if we prefer, it cuts the word in two segments
"dou-ceur." On another level, and because "ceur" was underlined
only insofar as we again hear "soeur," the rhyme brings the word
"douceur" to import, we could say, the word "soeur" which produced its analysis. In short, when it mobilizes a semantized particle,
the rhyme fabricates partial portmanteau words in filigree. Here:
"dou-soeur." Consequently, with such an arrangement, and whether
this delights or distresses, the semanticism of "douceur" finds itself
fraught with an insidious . . . sorority in this exclusive passage. It is
here a matter of a metacratylism in that the extraordinarily calculated or, if one prefers, poetic etymology-the one we could explicate
by daring to affirm that if we do believe these lines, the word "soeur"
is at the origin of the word "douceur"-totally surpasses, which is not
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol15/iss2/7
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without bearing, the principle of the much-doubted cratylian
etymology. Fully occupied ideologically with trying to obtain an
affinity between words and things, cratylism likes to see, often to the
point of abuse, primary words within others, alleged bearers in the last
resort, of their deepest meaning. Entirely dedicated structurally to
making the materiality of words prominent, the machine of rhymes for
example, traps with its mechanism-that makes it function in a conspicuous and regulated manner-the too unknown tendency of the
mind to magically link two ideas on the basis of "their" words.
By dissolving the initial formula, meaning is also made innocent
because the effect of translation eliminates the material arrangement
responsible, at least in part, for the substance itself of discourse. Even
if it seems a bit forced, it is perhaps useful, in matters of writing [ "dcriture"] to dramatically oppose two unequal points of view: the
common opinion (that of Bceotians who are not attentive to these
problems) and the technical judgement (that of writers when they
think about what they are doing). According to common opinion
writing is simply obtaining certain arrangements of words based upon
a certain meaning. According to technical judgement writing is also
obtaining meaning based on certain arrangements of words. And this
concern, which gives an actual role to consonances, among others in
the issuing of meaning, appears with two contrary perspectives: not
only that which is apparent, with their regulated research, but also
what is less visible, with their methodical refusal.
When Baudelaire, in order to achieve rhyme, places the two
words "douceur" and "soeur" in certain calculated parts of the ecrit,
not only does he provoke the supplementary issue of the semantic
effects sketched earlier, but he also makes one grasp that, far from
being a pure innocent assertion, what he enunciates has been
obliquely governed by the materiality required to say it. In effect, let
us first suppose, with perhaps a grain of salt, that the poet previously
wrote:
Mon enfant, ma mie,
Songe a la douceur
D'aller la-bas vivre ensemble. .

.

.

Let us suppose that he then realized that the rhyme fell short. Let us
suppose that finally, to obtain the desirable prescribed consonances,
he consented to one of these transformations:
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Mon enfant, ma soeur,
Songe a la douceur
D'aller lii-bas vivre ensemble.

. .

Mon enfant, ma mie,
Songe a l'alchimie
D'aller la-bas vivre ensemble.

. . .

.

There is no difficulty in seeing that with each of these solutions, he
would have accepted a semantic displacement: in the first case, from a
harmless tenderness to an incestuous affection; in the second, from a
sensitive well-being to a profound metamorphosis. Or, if one prefers,
the concern with obtaining regulated consonances is not insignificant
in the meaning that results.
And the same phenomenon is found, no less, with the systematic
refusal of the proximate return of the same sounds. When Flaubert, in
a letter on his work as a writer, shows himself "discovering in all sentences words to be changed, consonances to be removed," he does not
fail to make known that he proceeds to the final choice of words on the
basis of their sounds-after the fashion of the poet, and even if,
reversely. Let us once more suppose, to preserve the example, that
Flaubert first wrote the beginning of Baudelaire's poem. Let us then
suppose that he observed the consonance of "soeur" and "douceur,"
and that he later realized that in this manner he failed to repeat his
proscriptive writing rule. Let us finally suppose that in order to abolish
the repetition, he accepted, according to the substitutive interplay of
approximate synonyms, one of these changes: "Mon enfant, ma
soeur, songe au bien-etre," "Mon enfant, ma mie, songe a la
douceur. . . ." No difficulty, of course in comprehending that with
each of these solutions, he would have consented to a semantic shift:
from the sensitive "douceur" to the more abstract "well-being", from
the incestuous "ma soeur" to the harmless "ma mie." Or, if we prefer,
the concern with abolishing the consonances discovered is not insignificant either in the meaning that arises.
These examples, one will object, are too schematic and
imaginary to contain probing force. Yet this is far from certain. In
truth, except for the naivete of believing that ecrits, for many writers,
appear out of the blue, beyond reproach beneath the flow of the fountain pen, who could ever conceive poem or prose writers working
more or less in another way? Therefore by severing meaning from the
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol15/iss2/7
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material conditions of its issue, translation ineluctably obliterates
various dominant aspects of the intelligibility of the ecrit.
One can say that this cruel fundamental situation is subjected to
two contrary agents. On one hand, the informed translator [translateur] who attempts to translate what is problematic tries as much as
possible to restore, despite everything, that which the inevitable
change of formulas statutorily dissolves in the target language, supposing that he perceives it. On the other hand, the informed writer who
ends up problematizing translation mobilizes to the highest point the
material resources of its formulas through his specific work (and all
the more clearly if it is meta-representative). Actually in the case of
meta-representation it is easy to understand that the special supplementary regulations (the textures, I recall, according to Textics) form
two unequal ensembles: some of them, of course, because of their
peculiar nature (those, notably, that play on the numbers of elements
mobilized), can be, to a certain extent, transposed in another language, but many others are refractory, which prevents the transfer of
the overall structure in which they are involved. Insofar as the process
that shaped it pushes far, very far, the meta-representative concern,
Le Theatre des metamorphoses therefore seems to me, superlatively,
an "untranslatable" work.
That is not to say, however, that its translation, at least in part,
may not be attempted. In my view it is possible, but by making prominent one of the translator's efforts which remains too unknown: like a
reading machine. In effect, to become aware of translating the
problematic with an ecru that, in itself, systematically problematizes
translation, to me, could hardly be imagined except in the resolute
course of a translation itself problematic: an activity which would
assume the task of seeking ways out only to find dead ends, the structures in certain places which would rebel against transfer. Consequently, what, at best, takes refuge at times in minimal intrapaginal
remarks with the title Notes by the Ranslator, would open up into a
minute critical discourse as much on the pages to be translated as on
the gesture attempted for their translation, and would contribute
through this precise device to a theory of the text.
6. Doesn't thefact that this meta-representative concern defines
most of your fictional texts explain that in the United States your
theoretical work is better known than your novels or short stories?
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Insofar as a writer systematically works the structures of metarepresentation, and this is truly my principal effort in my novels and
short stories, then undoubtedly they make that which some would call
a sacrifice: that, to a very high point, of restricting the pertinence of
one's work to the only language in which it took place. A sacrifice?
This is far from certain for, as soon as it is understood, the game is perhaps worth the play. In effect, how much do the benefits of a readership possibly increased to the global scale, with the agreeable transfer
of a book in several languages (all this comes under, how to put it, the
economic, the sociological, the psychological for the writer) weigh
when compared to the unappreciable intellectual gains that one can
reap only through a certain "untranslatable" way of writing (they pertain to intellection of unknown functionings of thought)?
And to say a little more concerning this field, I consider, according to what texticians call a scalar appraisal, that one must know how
to trace a line between two sorts of universality. A low universality:
that of translation, which can only distribute a meta-representative
work on a large scale by eliminating, in principle, some of its essential
traits. A high universality: that of the untranslatable, which makes
conceivable, not translation, but what must be called an interlinguistic correlation: the bringing to light (should it happen to be
more or less emphasized) or writing (should it occur that the work be
more or less flawed) in the target language of a completely different
work, at first sight, and close in depth because it obeys identical principles. In short, the restriction of a work to its own language, far from
producing an enclosure, is what in relation to another language, makes
possible a less naive communication, not that of such and such a
meaning, but that of the machine that produces meanings.
7. The preamble of Le Theatre des metamorphoses, "Appreciation," shatply attacks the functioning of the press often with humor
and sometimes with sarcasm. At the same time it dismantles its
effects on our reading practices. Thispolitical and polemical dimension of the book is noteworthy. Your reader who is often led to
develop plays on the signifiers in the wake ofthe text could see in this
counter model a way of opposing that which the "press "favors: for
example, "press" and "haste" in reading, "compression" or
"stereotypical reduction of reality" (p. 23), "pressure" on our ways
of thinking ("the regulation of readings," p. 14); therefore doesn't
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Le ThCatre des metamorphoses function as a sort of "anti-press

machine"?
Yes, one can say Le Theatre des metamorphoses is a sort of
"anti-press machine," but at the price of an initial precaution: that
which distinguishes the two words which the utterance "the press"
superimposes, at least in French. "The press"? This means haste.
"The press"? This means the newspapers. Certainly on one hand, Le
Theatre des metamorphoses is an "anti-haste machine." To be brief,
all readers who read rapidly are unconscious illiterates. On the other,
no less, Le Theatre des metamorphoses is an "anti-newspaper
machine." Doubtless the two machines are related: "press" functions to "press" or, if one prefers, newspapers function to hasten. But
to speak of haste is to aim at a functioning of representation and to
speak of newspapers is to touch upon a site of representation. Allow
me to pursue this last point.
Yes, we can say Le Theatre des metamorphoses is an "antinewspaper machine," but at the price of a new precaution: the one
stipulating that the offensive which in effect may be found, far from
responding to an objective (the book does not progress in order to
question the press), comes about, which is slightly different, as a consequence (the book, as it progresses, finds itself contesting the
press).
This phenomenon springs from dissymmetry: that which characterizes the clash of representation with meta-representation. Representation, as a system of thought, refuses meta-representation
because representation fears it (tending in practice to defend itself
against the return of what it obliterates in order to come about). Metarepresentation, as a system of thought, considers representation,
because it surpasses representation (tending in practice to question, to
take place, that which representation obliterates). As a result, metarepresentative activity contemplates representative manoeuvers from
above and it is from below that the manoeuvers of representation perceive meta-representative activity.
Meta-representative activity contemplates it from above?
Practically concerned with obtaining mechanisms capable of
disclosing that which representation dissolves and theoretically
curious to understand the relevant procedures, as it progresses, metarepresentative activity encounters representation in that it produces a
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negative censorship. Subsequently, meta-representative activity is
capable of exposing to what point the representative exercise commits, as much as it can, a double nullification: on one hand, the
obliteration of all material means through which it represents; on the
other, the eviction of all objects, or of all that which, in an object,
resists representation. Yet, what characterizes the "press" could well
be, on one hand, its hegemonic function according to representation
("universal reportage," I believe, Stephane Mallarme said) and, on
the other, today, its growing ascendancy ("journalism, outcome of
philosophy," I think Michel Foucault said). As a result, because it
keeps losing all sense of proportion through arrogant expansionism,
from the angle of its object, one can understand the double stereotype
it inflicts on reality. On one level, a conformity of selection (which
causes it to choose and promote what is representable) and, on
another, a conformity of behavior (which brings some people,
willingly, under such power, to conform in order to be confirmed, to
become representable).
Representative manoeuvers perceive from below? To be brief,
here is what a funny example reveals: the slight misfortune which
befell the newspaper Le Monde's serial writer, Bertrand PoirotDelpech, on the occasion of his harsh attack, of course, on Le Theritre
des metamorphoses. Wanting to show that I wrote badly, he quoted
four sentences from this book and, consciously or not, one doesn't
know which is worse, he tampered with three of them. Must one add
that among these sentences may be found precisely the one that
evokes the . . . "stereotypical reduction, of reality?"
8. What you described earlier as the "internal process of a
somewhat reflected work" led you towards writing workshops, as
you yourself recall at the end of "Les raisons de rensemble," the
complementary study you recently added to the new edition (revised
and completed for Seuils, -Points" collection) of your best known
work (Le Nouveau Roman, p. 248). In the United States writing
workshops have for a long time been semi-institutionalized within
the university while in France, where they are just beginning to be
recognized, you today appear as one oftheir most fervent precursors.
Marianne Alphant in a recent survey ("Le mal des mots," Lib6ration, 19 April 1990, p. 24) recalled your work as a pioneer in this
field, notably in Paris at the College International de Philosophie
and in certain symposia on text didactics at Cerisy-la-Salle. Today
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of workshops in relation to

other parallel currents?
In effect, it has certainly been an internal necessity for various
aspects of my work which has led me towards the principle of writing
workshops. I would rather not specify the ensemble of these operational obligations (deriving from the constructive principles of my
work), but I would like to clarify at least two.
One could be called the necessary collectivity In the study you
mention, "Les raisons de l'ensemble," I tried to make clear how a
writer becomes sensitive to the collective once he accepts himself as a
scriptor instead of an author. However in this case the collective
presents two modes of integration. Gentle integration, tied to
grouping (one admits that one's personal work can be referred not to
the standards of the person that supplied it, but rather, compared to
the work of several others), and this is the reason I participated in the
Nouveau Roman. Strong integration, tied to cooperation (one
accepts that one's personal contribution finds itself articulated with
the work of others) and this explains my recourse to writing
workshops.
The other obligation could be titled the fundamental triad.
According to my views an activity can not be integrally completed
from the operational angle unless it is connected with a practice, a
theory, didactics. It is not possible for me here to emphasize either the
deployed triad, laying out the relations of each of its sub-activities to
the others (how each helps the other and benefits from it) or
redeployed triad arranging the insertions of each with the others (how
each one is an intrinsic part of the other). However, since we are
dealing with writing I can briefly make clear some rudimentary
aspects of the deployed triad beginning with one of its three foci, that
of didactics.
The didactics of writing supposes that the organizer possesses an
effective practice of the act of writing. In fact, it is such a practice that
allows her to say, with full knowledge of the practice: "here is how we
must proceed." In short, the practice of the organizer gives force to the
example in collectivity. Let us say that practice contributes psychological supports (the partners are less unwilling towards someone
who has already proved her capacity with her works, or can put them
right away to the test) and a technical assistance (when an example is
taken not from another writer but from her own resources, or from her
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own immediate improvisation, one presents it knowing whether or not
the case is easy).
The didactics of writing presumes no less that the organizer has
an explicit theory of the act of writing. In effect, this theory plays at
least a double role. On one level, if its firmness and clearness are sufficient, this theory permits the organizer to say with all the required precision: "here is what must be done." In short, an explicit theory
improves communication in collectivity. It brings a coherence and a
rigor in specifying the work perspective, in the stipulation of the target
structures, in the clarification of what must be accomplished. On
another level, if its abstraction and elaboration are sufficient they
guarantee that the organizer is less likely to surreptitiously impose, in
total opposition of collective work, certain tastes that could be his
own. Without an assiduous practice and elaborated theory of what we
propose, we risk falling into the vague: inviting others to do what corresponds to one's own simple preferences, and which we perhaps do
not know how to do very well, perhaps without being very capable of
successfully inviting to perform. . . .
Without of course wishing to prejudge activities that are realized
under the sign of writing workshops, the functioning that I advocate
would induce me probably to ask straightaway, from the organizers'
point of view, at least one of these two questions. To the literary hack,
let us say, supposing that his writing appeared effective to me, "Where
is your theory?" To the professor, let us say, assuming that he disposes
of a theory: "Where is your practice?" I wonder if these two questions are not enough to define, without doubt in the company of a few
others, a rather exclusive place. . . .
One last word. Although it seems improbable that I deserve
them, to suppose the titles "precursor" and "pioneer" poses the risk
of a double edge.
They can be useful if one considers them within the perspective
of intellection. Not having been the last to grasp a certain thing means
to find oneself with a title, in effect of the precise configuration of
thought which made such an understanding possible. Thus for me, it is
the fundamental correlating triad, practice, theory, didactics, always
active in my reflection, that has allowed me, not only, the visible portion of the iceberg, if one may say so, to give, for example, in the
middle of the eighties a seminar on writing workshops at the Coll6ge
International de Philosophie in Paris, but also, earlier in the sixties
and seventies, to give an increasingly experimental form to my
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teaching of writing at the high school level. In effect, the two questions that I always feel like asking others, I had of course asked myself
first. In short: "You who claim to be a teacher of writing, how does
your teaching imply your theory of the text, your practice as writer?"
Consequently, with the utmost prudence, for unless one has an excessive tendency towards irresponsibility, students should never be considered mere guinea pigs, my teaching has incessantly evolved. I gave
a minimal idea of this in my article "Ecrire en classe," published in
1978 in the pedagogical review Pratiques. Allow me simply to
emphasize two aspects. On one level, concerning the structures of the
ecrit, the increasing bringing into play of parallelisms (notably since
they allow a mechanism to be considered according to a plurality of
integrated examples) and the concern with the articulation of the
characteristic work of various students (each "essay" being personal
at the base but capable of relating to the ensemble). On another, concerning the structure of teaching, the increasing integration of various
disciplines, regarding language (grammar, vocabulary) and, to a certain extent, the rest (the other forms of knowledge) in the production
of the ecrit itself.
But the titles of "precursor" and "pioneer" could be misleading,
no less in this case, for they could encourage two misunderstandings.
One could come from the possible surreptitious shifting from one
perspective to another: from intellection (having at last succeeded in
understanding a certain thing) to competition (being one of the first to
have succeeded). This could risk drawing more attention to the performance aspect of the novelty than to the instructive reasons which
allowed it to take place in someone. The other, more serious, would lie
in the creation of an artificial homogeneousness: the "pioneer" being
s/he who cleared the way. To concede this role to such a person tends
to imply the idea that s/he was eventually followed, in short that those
who supposedly came behind accomplished similar tasks since they
took the same route. If it is certainly not prohibited for anyone to
exhibit the sign of the writing workshop, one should be careful to avoid
all notions that could lead us to believe, on the whole, in an identical
activity everywhere. "Precursor-ship" encourages this danger.
9. For you "writing" actually means "rewriting." "Workshop
writing" implies more a sort of "trans-subjective" writing, that is,
collective and interactive writing where each one in turn assumes the
role ofreader and writer of the other. In an important article on the
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topic ("Pour une theorie de la rdcriture," Podtique 77, 1989) you
conclude with the following eloquent formula, "Be what in writing
you become." Would you care to comment?
Assuming that writing is always more or less rewriting, we can, if
we wish to go quickly, make this evident with a sort of paradox. How
do most people operate with their missive? They write with the flow of
the fountain pen, at best reread themselves without crossing out
hardly anything and, even, simply avoid rereading. In short, and since
they do not see any reason for perfecting their first version, they suppose, they who do not claim to be writers, that in fact they know how to
write. . . . Inversely, those who call themselves writers, recognize
themselves notably-oh profusion of drafts!-by the proliferation of
their erasures. In short, and since they incessantly labor to improve
their ecrit, they in fact suppose that they scarcely know how to
write. . . . But of course, the paradox is merely apparent: against the
difficulty of writing, the gesture of crossing out betrays not a lack, but
rather a knowledge: that of improving. Consequently, and except for
inverting the roles, one must agree: the writer is s/he who crosses out,
briefly rewrites because s/he has the aptitude. The others are those
who exempt themselves because they are lacking in this respect.
If then writing specifically is supplying, not a first draft (since
everyone is free to do so as long as he is not orthographically
impaired), but rather through an interplay of erasures, an ensemble of
improvements (since this, precisely is how the writer distinguishes
from others), then to write, even though it might surprise, is to
incessantly become someone else. Confronting his first version, he
who leaves it as such assures that he has remained the same; he who
transforms it thus attests that he has become different. He is the
person who no longer accepts what he accepted before from his ecrit.
Yet this metamorphosis, made apparent by the erasure, has taken
place slightly before. He who continuously leaves his ecrit untouched
is the one who, going over it, again finds what he meant to say (this
what Textics calls recouverte). The person who resolutely transforms
his ecrit is the one, who, looking at it, perceives, at least in part that
which he actually inscribed, (this is what deserves to be called,
properly, rereading). The writer is he who, rereading himself with
another eye, sufficiently avoids the hallucination of "something to
say" in order to see "something written." The writer is therefore, not
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he who, persevering in his being, expresses himself, but he who,
crossing out, has transformed himself in his act.
Consequently I can answer two aspects of your question.
It is because a writer always proceeds as two (she who inscribes
and she who making herself rather different knows how to reread herself) that it is possible to write as several. It is because writing always
mobilizes another internal self that it can be accomplished in principle with another external self. But this is possible only on the condi-

tion that otherness truly takes place. This is what makes operational
reversibility possible in a workshop: external otherness can be someone else's otherness only if she equally bears within herself another
self whose otherness is the relay for the other. Briefly one must
prevent subjectivity (maintaining a "self") from finding itself
replaced by neo-subjectivity (the domination by one exterior "self" of
the other) or through inter-subjectivity (the mutual transactions of the
respective "selves" which leaves each one the same) and to attain a
trans-subjectivity, as you put it well (the reciprocal attenuation of
respective "selves"). What makes possible such a rapport is, of
course, the presence in a workshop of a theory which is effective in the
detachment of its abstraction and the precision of its concepts.
It is because a writer, perhaps in spite of himself, only operates
while he continues accepting the activity of the other within himselfwhich is not without bearing-that I took the liberty of inverting the
famous Nietzschean formula as an exhortation "Become who you
are," which stresses the potentiality of being into "Be what in writing
you become," which invites one to accept one's operational
metamorphosis.
10. Among your latest fictional texts, two in particular are not
only delightful but also remarkable in that, pursuing the Theatre
experience, they inaugurate a new ricardolian "revolution." The
rhythm, play with tenses, breaks, interpolated clauses, in short, how
could I say, the manner, the spiraling art of "phrasing" today draw
my attention with Revelations minuscules, en guise de preface, a la
gloire de Jean Paulhan and the first short story from La cathedrale de
Sens, Le lapsus circulaire. Would you care to say a few words about
these texts?

For thirty years now I have intensified my assiduous efforts on
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the page and at the same time attempted to obtain a coherent and
minute theory of ecriture. Therefore, it is not impossible after such
labor that I ended up succeeding, notably with these two texts, indeed
the most recent, in various tiny things. Moreover it would be difficult
for me to give an idea of them in a few words. To put it simply, I will
merely oppose these two texts to my 1982 volume. Le Theatre des
metamorphoses clearly displays an experimental status: it is on an
immediately spectacular mode that it mobilizes one graphic and
typographic diversity, as well as abundant structures established in
excess. Thus, it happens that parallelisms overly develop in long
series according to links and accumulations that border on frenzy. On
the other hand, Le lapsus circulaire and Revelations minuscules, en
guise de preface, a la gloire de Jean Paulhan on the whole obey a
greater reserve. It does not mean that correlative oddities are fewer
but, apart from crises here and there of elucidation, they tend to blend
in a flow more smoothly although still pirouetting. I would prefer in
this respect to speak of an underhanded classicism through which
many traditional resources of harmonious prose, to borrow here the
language of the Academy, are caught in structural interplays which
surreptitiously overstep them.
What distinguishes Le Lapsus circulaire and Revelations
minuscules, en guise depreface, a la gloire de Jean Paulhan from the
rnixt Le Theatre des metamorphoses is not a strategical divergence: it
is still a question of dismantling fallacious representative innocence
through the virtues of meta-representation. Rather it is a tactical difference: the point is to restrict ostentatious permanent structural
aggressivity in order to subtract the conspicuous support that it might
give the reader and to diminish in this way the new intellectual comfort, to the second power in a certain sense, which as a result could
settle into place.
11. I gathered, in the course ofyour last seminar on Textics at
Cerisy, that this discipline, according to you, aspired not only to

explain theoretically different structures of the ecrit, but that it
involved a sort ofcombat, even a philosophical or ideological "mission." Could you clarify this stance?
In its nascent elaboration, Textics encounters the three main concerns of all attempts at knowledge: the delimitation of its field, the efficiency of its analyses and the coherence of its concepts.
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The delimitation of its field? From the beginning, Textics
restrained its domain to the ecrit (understood as an ensemble of marks
associated with a language flanguel and left on a support by means of
an adequate instrument), inasmuch as it can bear scriptures (structures whose effect is to represent) or textures (structures whose effect
is to meta-represent). Textics may be therefore divided into two
branches: Scriptics, which studies scriptures, and Textics proper,
which studies textures.
The efficiency of its analyses? As it progresses, Textics applies
itself to multiplying a large variety of examples-either of already
admitted arrangements or of others that are less so and up to details at
times minute-on which it tests the operational fecundity of its views;
in short, it puts itself to the test through the field it has defined.
The coherence of its concepts? Its postulate, according to which
the ecrit can only be representative (that is, evidently with possible
flaws in this register, taco -representative), or meta-representative
(that is, of course, with its possible faults from this angle, cacometarepresentative), seems to establish, at least for now, as it develops, an
intellectual apparatus capable ofarticulately conceiving all the structures of the ecrit in their relationships.
Thus Textics is at once closed (through the restraints of the
specificities of its field), and open (because of the nature of its postulate). It operates around a specific scope and supposes an expansion.
In effect, the ecrit as we know is not the only means that allows representation. Therefore, through a first enlargement, and on the condition, of course, that one changes what must accordingly be changed,
nothing prevents testing its postulate and methods through other
fields. Eventually Textics' vocation is to expand into pantextics,
general Textics including sectorial Textics: scriptotextics (applied to
the ecrit), iconotextics (applied to the image).
However expandable it may be, representation could very well
present a part-misleading for the whole-of the intrinsic mechanisms of structural obfuscation. Likewise, an entity could very
well-because it subordinates them like components-always
weaken, more or less, the various elements that it involves. As a
result, according to a second enlargement, pantextics would seek to
expand into metatextics, all-encompassing Textics overstepping the
minimal immense representative domain, and having as object the
possibility ofstructural disclosing ofelements which every structure
that organizes them obfuscates.
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It is therefore not impossible that one discipline concerned technically and up to a microscopical point with its own field may eventually foresee, in its possible extensions, a questioning of any institution from the other end. No longer by breaking ties according to a
blind expeditious destitution, but rather, by increasing relations
according to what would have to be called a-paradoxical-

transtitution.
Translated by Barbara Carle and Michel Sirvent
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